State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Michael Rowan and Rebecca George, Defendant/Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) 
2015 
State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Michael Rowan and Rebecca 
George, Defendant/Appellee 
Utah Supreme Court 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Reply Brief, State of Utah vs. Rowan and George, No. 20150598 (Utah Supreme Court, 2015). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3264 
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. 
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback. 
 
Case No. 20150598-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL ROWAN AND REBECCA GEORGE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
RICHARD P. GALE 
2155 North Freedom Blvd. 
Provo, UT  84604  
DOUGLAS J. THOMPSON 
Utah County Public Defender Ass’n 
51 South University Ave., Ste. 206 
Provo, UT  84604 
 
 
 
 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
SEAN D. REYES (7969) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT  84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
 
MARIANE O’BRYANT 
Utah County Attorney’s Office  
Counsel for Appellees Counsel for Appellant 
 
-i- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 1 
I. THE MAGISTRATE ISSUING THE SEARCH WARRANT HAD A 
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE. .................... 1 
A.  Section 14’s probable cause requirement is the same as the 
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement. .............................. 3 
1.  When interpreting Section 14, this Court should look to its 
text and to the purpose and intent of its framers and the 
people who ratified it........................................................................... 5 
2.  Section 14 was generally intended to provide the same 
protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment. ..................... 7 
a.  The text of Section 14 is the surest indication that the 
protections afforded thereunder were intended to 
mirror those of the Fourth Amendment. ................................... 7 
b.  The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision 
suggests that Utah’s framers intended to provide 
protections that mirrored the Fourth Amendment. ................. 8 
c.  Historical evidence suggests that both the framers and 
the people of Utah intended that Section 14 afford the 
same Fourth Amendment protections. ..................................... 14 
3.  The cases cited by Defendants do not support the 
proposition that the probable cause requirement of Section 
14 is more demanding than that of the Fourth 
Amendment. ....................................................................................... 21 
B.  This Court should pay great deference to the magistrate’s 
probable cause determination on a warrant. ........................................ 24 
C.  The magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the 
warrant was supported by probable cause. .......................................... 30 
-ii- 
II. SECTION 14 CONTEMPLATES THE USUAL REMEDIES OF 
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW, NOT EXCLUSION AT 
TRIAL. ............................................................................................................... 37 
III. A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
WOULD, IN ANY EVENT, BE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
INTENT OF THE FRAMERS AND THE PEOPLE OF UTAH 
WHO RATIFIED THE STATE CONSTITUTION. ...................................... 45 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 47 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................... 48 
ADDENDA (State Constitutional Comparison Chart) 
   
  
-iii- 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases 
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) ......................................................... 43, 44 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ................................................ 42, 43, 45 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) ....... 29 
Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925) ....................................................... 23 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) ................................................................ 27 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) .............................................................. passim 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) .......................................................... 28 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) ............................................................ 24 
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984) ......................................................... 31 
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) ........................... 4 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) .................................................................... 39 
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948)...................................................... 42 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) ...................................................... 41 
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006) ........................................................... 28 
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) .............................................. 35, 36, 37 
United States v. Jackson, 470 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2006) .......................................... 27 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) ....................................................... 41 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) ....................................................... 29, 41 
-iv- 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435  (1976) ........................................................... 4 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) ............................................... 28, 31 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ................................................... 28 
State Cases 
Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939) ........................................ 21, 22 
American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 2006 UT 40 .............. 6, 7, 8 
Beller v. Rolfe, 2008 UT 68-33 & , 194 P.3d 949 .................................................... 40 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, 122 P.3d 506 .................................................. 3 
Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Metcalf) 329 (1841) .................................... 44 
In re Jensen, 2011 UT 17, 250 P.3d 465 ................................................38, 39, 46, 47 
Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997) ........................... 23, 24 
Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, 177 P.3d 655 ................................ 23, 24 
Sawyer v. Dep’t of Workforce Services, 2015 UT 33, 345 P.3d 1253 ..................... 25 
Sims v. Collection Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6  
 (Utah 1992) ...................................................................................................... 4, 40 
State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923) ................................................. 39, 46 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985) ...................................................... 31 
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699 ............................................................. 2, 5 
State v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546 (Utah 2000) ................................................... 2, 4, 47 
State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23, 156 P.3d 795 ............................................................. 26 
-v- 
State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) ......................................................... 23 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987) ............................................................ 33 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) .......................................................... 4, 5 
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096 ....................................................... 26, 27 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) ............................................................. 26 
State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, 203 P.3d 1000 ......................................................... 29 
State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105 ...................................................................... 32, 33, 35 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) ......................................................... 4 
State v. Thurmond, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) ..................................................... 25 
State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106 .................................................. 5, 6 
State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, 267 P.3d 210 ................................................ 39, 42, 43 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988) .................................................... 4, 5, 21 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 164 P.3d 397 .......................................................... 5 
Federal Provisions 
U.S Const. art. I, § 9 ................................................................................................ 18 
U.S. Const. amend. IV ............................................................................................ 12 
U.S. Const. amend. XIII ......................................................................................... 17 
U.S. Const., art. III .................................................................................................. 16 
 
  
-vi- 
State Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 (West 2015).............................................................. 46 
Utah Const. art. I, § 1 ............................................................................................. 16 
Utah Const. art. I, § 4 ............................................................................................. 16 
Utah Const. art. I, § 6 ............................................................................................. 16 
Utah Const. art. I, § 9 ............................................................................................. 16 
Utah Const. art. I, § 10 ........................................................................................... 16 
Utah Const. art. I, § 12 ..................................................................................... 16, 19 
Utah Const. art. I, § 13 ........................................................................................... 16 
Utah Const. art. I, sec. 14 ........................................................................... 10, 12, 14 
Utah Const. art. I, § 15 ........................................................................................... 16 
Utah Const. art. I, sec. 19 ........................................................................... 10, 12, 16 
Utah Const. art. I, § 20 ........................................................................................... 16 
Utah Const. art. I, § 22 ........................................................................................... 16 
Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 ........................................................................................... 13 
 
  
-vii- 
Other Authorities 
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt 
Lake City on the Fourth Day of March, 1895, to Adopt a Constitution for the 
State of Utah 1847 (Salt Lake City, Star Printing Co. 1898) ............... 10, 15-20 
 
Paul Cassell, Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the 
Antipolygamy Raids, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1 (1995) ............................11, 12, 13, 15 
 
Paul Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules 
Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751 (1993) . 6, 
13 

Case No. 20150598-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL ROWAN AND REBECCA GEORGE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
 
 Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State 
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in the appellee’s brief.  
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The magistrate issuing the search warrant had a sub-
stantial basis for finding probable cause. 
 The State has argued that contrary to the trial court’s conclusions, the 
search warrant affidavit satisfied the Fourth Amendment probable cause 
requirement. Aplt.Brf. 12-20. But Defendants argue that the affidavit did not 
satisfy the probable cause requirement of Article I, § 14 (“Section 14”) and 
that this Court should conduct de novo review under the State constitution. 
Aplt.Brf. 12-22. Neither claim was made below.  
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 In their first motion to suppress, Defendants argued that the affidavit 
did not establish probable cause under either the Fourth Amendment or 
Section 14. R27-37. But Defendants’ Section 14 claim was nominal, claiming 
only that it “ ‘provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth 
Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.’ ” R36-37 
(quoting State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶15, 103 P.3d 699, and State v. DeBooy, 
996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000)). Not surprisingly, the district court did not 
address Defendants’ state constitutional claim in its order denying the mo-
tion to suppress. It simply ruled that the warrant was not supported by 
probable cause but admitted the evidence under the Fourth Amendment’s 
good faith exception, as articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 879 
(1984). See R226-32.  
 Apparently seeking relief on alternative grounds, Defendants for the 
first time on appeal propose new, distinct state constitutional standards for 
both probable cause and the review of a magistrate’s probable cause deter-
mination. They argue that (1) Section 14’s probable cause requirement is 
more demanding than the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause require-
ment, Aple.Brf. 18-22, and (2) the magistrate’s probable cause determination 
should be reviewed de novo, not with “great deference” as under the 
Fourth Amendment, Aple.Brf. 12-18. Defendants now make these claims 
-3- 
despite the fact that in their motion to suppress, they relied on State cases 
that treated the state and federal standards the same. See R27-37 and cases 
cited therein. 
 Defendants’ request that the Court affirm the trial court’s ruling on 
their proposed, distinct constitutional standards seems to stretch the appel-
late doctrine of affirming on alternative grounds beyond its contemplated 
limits—i.e., asking the Court to affirm on a basis in the law that has never 
before been recognized by the Court. That said, this Court should reject dif-
ferent standards under the State constitution.  
A. Section 14’s probable cause requirement is the same as the 
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement. 
 Defendants argue that the probable cause requirement for warrants 
under Section 14 is more demanding than that under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Aple.Brf. 18-22. To the contrary, when the framers of the Utah Consti-
tution drafted Section 14, they intended to afford the same protections 
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. 
 This Court has observed that “federal Fourth Amendment protections 
may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by [Section 14 of] our state 
constitution.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 506 (empha-
sis added), overruled on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). That said, the 
Court has historically “considered the protections afforded to be one and 
-4- 
the same.” State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). Even in those rare 
cases where the Court has examined an issue under an independent state 
constitutional analysis, it has generally adopted the Fourth Amendment 
doctrine. See, e.g., State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 19, 996 P.2d 546 (adopting 
“analysis and rationale” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in examining 
administrative highway checkpoints); Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 (holding that 
like Fourth Amendment, Section 14 does not protect against unreasonable 
private searches); Sims v. Collection Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841 
P.2d 6, 10, 14-15 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion) (adopting analysis and ra-
tionale of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), in 
concluding that quasi-criminal proceedings are subject to exclusionary rule).  
 In only one circumstance has a majority of this Court held that Sec-
tion 14 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. In State v. 
Thompson, the Court held that unlike the Fourth Amendment, Section 14 
recognizes a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records. 810 P.2d 415, 
417-18 (Utah 1991) (rejecting rationale of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 
442 (1976)). Another case often cited as an example of providing greater pro-
tections garnered the support of only a plurality: State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 464-71 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (concluding that car thief had 
reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen car).  
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 In sum, “the truism that article I, section 14 may provide greater pro-
tections to Utah citizens than the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Worwood, 
2007 UT 47, ¶19, 164 P.3d 397, does not mean that it provides broader pro-
tections generally. Indeed, a review of Section 14’s text, its evolution, and its 
historical backdrop reveals that the framers’ intended that it provide the 
same protections as those guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. 
1. When interpreting Section 14, this Court should look to 
its text and to the purpose and intent of its framers and 
the people who ratified it.  
 The threshold question is whether this Court should concern itself at 
all with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when examining Section 14, and 
if so, under what circumstances it should “depart from federal Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and chart [its] own course.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 
¶16 n.2, 2004 UT 95. As the State explained in its opening brief, this Court 
should answer that question by turning first to the constitutional text itself, 
and then to historical evidence of the framers’ intent and the intent of the 
people who ratified the state constitution. See Aplt.Brf. 31-33. 
 This Court has suggested that federal analysis which is flawed, con-
fusing, or inconsistent may also justify independent analysis. State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 37, 162 P.3d 1106 (citing Larocco, 794 P.2d at 467-70, 
and Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8). But a perceived flaw in federal analysis is 
-6- 
not a principled basis for departing from the federal standard. Indeed, in-
terpreting the state provision differently simply because the court believes 
the federal analysis to be flawed is not an interpretive framework at all. It is 
reactive and result-oriented, and irrelevant to a determination of the fram-
ers’ intent.  
 As explained in Justice Durrant’s concurring opinion in American 
Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, “a historical analysis of our state constitution 
is the most appropriate interpretive course to follow when confronted with 
constitutional questions.” 2006 UT 40, at ¶ 86, 2006 UT 40 (Durrant, J., con-
curring). In this context, it is the most appropriate method for determining 
whether Section 14 provides broader search and seizure protections than 
the Fourth Amendment. This interpretive framework anchors the judicial 
enterprise “to the text of the constitution as understood and intended by its 
framers and the voters who ratified it” and “provides stability to state gov-
ernment while remaining true to the principle that it is the people of this 
state who should ultimately determine how our society should be struc-
tured.” Id. at ¶¶ 83-84; accord Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of 
Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Ex-
ample, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 774-80 (1993) (endorsing “historically-based” 
approach that incorporates neutral principles). 
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2. Section 14 was generally intended to provide the same 
protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment.  
 An examination of the text, background, and history of Section 14 re-
veals that its framers, and the people who ratified it, generally intended to 
preserve the same protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.  
a. The text of Section 14 is the surest indication that the 
protections afforded thereunder were intended to mir-
ror those of the Fourth Amendment. 
 The language of Section 14 “contains the surest indication of the in-
tent of its framers and the citizens of Utah who voted it into effect.” Ameri-
can Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶16. In all relevant respects, Section 14 is identical to 
the Fourth Amendment. It differs only in punctuation, capitalization, and 
the omission of the unnecessary “and” that precedes “particularly” in the 
Fourth Amendment: 
Fourth Amendment (differences identified with editing marks) 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to 
be seized. 
-8- 
 Nothing in the text of Section 14 indicates any enlargement or expan-
sion of rights beyond those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. Like the 
Fourth Amendment, Section 14 secures the right of the people “against un-
reasonable searches and seizures,” and like the Fourth Amendment, it re-
quires that warrants be based “upon probable cause,” be “supported by 
oath or affirmation,” and “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched[,] 
and the person(s) or thing(s) to be seized.” Id. As further explained below, 
this identity of language is strongly indicative of the framers’ intent to pro-
vide protections identical to those of the Fourth Amendment.  
b. The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision 
suggests that Utah’s framers intended to provide pro-
tections that mirrored the Fourth Amendment. 
 The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision also suggests 
that the framers intended to provide Utah citizens with the same protec-
tions as those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. The constitutional 
convention of 1895 represented the territory’s sixth attempt at statehood. See 
Linda Thatcher, A Chronology of Utah Statehood, Beehive History 21, at 28-32 
(1995). The search and seizure provision of the territory’s six proposed con-
stitutions evolved from a version unlike the Fourth Amendment to a ver-
sion that is, in all material respects, identical to the Fourth Amendment: 
-9- 
 1849 Draft. The people shall be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.1  
 1862 Draft. The people shall be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.2  
 1872 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures 
and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, par-
ticularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the 
person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.3  
 1882 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, par-
ticularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the 
person or persons, and thing or things, to be seized.4 
 1887 Draft. The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, par-
                                              
1 1849 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, Art. VIII, sec. 6, re-
produced in Laws of Utah 44, 55 (1855) [hereinafter “1849 Draft Const., art. 
VIII, § 6”]. 
2 1862 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, Art. II, sec. 5, as re-
ported in THE DESERET NEWS, Jan. 29, 1862, at 242 [hereinafter “1862 Draft 
Const., art. II, § 5.”]. 
3 1872 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. I, sec. 18, as re-
ported in THE DESERET NEWS, Mar. 6, 1872, at 53 [hereinafter “1872 Draft 
Const., art. I, § 18”]. 
4 1882 Draft Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. I, sec. 16, as re-
ported in Constitution of the State of Utah: Adopted by the Convention, 
April 27, 1882 [hereinafter “1882 Draft Const., art. I, § 16”]. 
-10- 
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.5 
 1895. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized.6 
 The 1849 and 1862 drafts were identical, and included only a reason-
ableness clause. They did not include a warrant clause, as found in the 
Fourth Amendment and almost all state constitutions of the time. See State-
by-State Comparison Chart [hereinafter “CC”] (Addendum). And rather 
than tracking the reasonableness language of the Fourth Amendment, the 
1849 and 1862 versions tracked the language found in the Delaware, Penn-
sylvania, and Connecticut constitutions (using active voice and referring to 
“possessions” rather than “effects”). See CC, 1-2.7   
                                              
5 1887 Draft Constitution of the State of Utah, art. I, sec. 19, as report-
ed in THE DESERET NEWS, Jul. 13, 1887, at 412 [hereinafter “1887 Draft 
Const., art. I, § 19”]. 
6 Utah Const. art. I, sec. 14; 2 Proceedings at 1856. 
7 The constitutions of Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hamp-
shire, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Maine, Michigan, and 
Texas also substantially tracked the reasonableness clause language of Del-
aware, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. See CC, at B2-7. The Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Ohio constitutions referred to “possessions” rather than “ef-
fects,” but used the passive “shall not be violated” language. See CC, at B4-
5. 
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 Subsequent drafts adopted the format of the Fourth Amendment, in-
corporating both a reasonableness clause and a warrant clause. These ver-
sions also abandoned the constitutional language of Delaware, Pennsylva-
nia, and Connecticut, in favor of Fourth Amendment phraseology. While 
similar to the Fourth Amendment, the 1872 version appears to have “simply 
incorporated Nevada’s search and seizure guarantee.” Paul G. Cassell, 
Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the Antipolyga-
my Raids, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995). “More than 120 copies of the Nevada 
Constitution were printed and distributed to the delegates” at the conven-
tion. Id. The 1872 delegates thereafter adopted a search and seizure provi-
sion that, but for some differences in capitalization, was identical to that 
found in the Nevada Constitution, with its somewhat unique and awkward 
language.8 It thus secured the right against unreasonable “seizures and 
searches” and provided that warrants may not issue “but on probable cause, 
. . . particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the person or 
persons, and thing or things to be seized.” 1872 Draft Const., art. I, sec. 18 (em-
phasized language denoting differences from Fourth Amendment); CC, at 9.  
                                              
8 Utah’s version only differed in that unlike the Nevada provision, it 
did not capitalize “oath” or “affirmation.” See CC, at B9. 
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 The 1882 version abandoned the “seizures and searches” language of 
the Nevada model, adopting instead the “searches and seizures” language 
of the Fourth Amendment. See 1882 Draft Const., art. I, § 16. Other than 
some punctuation differences, it made no other changes to the Nevada 
model. The 1887 version moved further away from the Nevada model, dis-
carding the awkward warrant clause language. See CC, at 9. The 1887 ver-
sion instead tracked the language of the Fourth Amendment, requiring that 
warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.” 1887 Draft Const., art. I, § 19; U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
 The final and current search and seizure provision, adopted at the 
1895 Constitutional Convention, represented a final repudiation of the Ne-
vada model, replacing “on probable cause” with the Fourth Amendment 
language, “upon probable cause.” Id. As explained above, the 1895 version 
is materially identical to the Fourth Amendment, making only minor stylis-
tic changes to the Fourth Amendment language.  
 In sum, the framers chose to mirror the language of the Fourth 
Amendment even though they had a variety of other models to choose 
from. They might have chosen to pattern Section 14 after the more broadly 
worded Washington provision, which stated that “[n]o person shall be dis-
turbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
-13- 
law.” Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 (Oct. 1, 1889); see also Utah Example, supra, at 
751, 801 & n.312. They might have specified that the probable cause show-
ing be made in writing or by affidavit, as required under the constitutions of 
Rhode Island, Illinois, Missouri, Colorado, South Dakota, Montana, Idaho, 
and Wyoming. See CC, at 4,6,9-10. They might have chosen to adopt the 
language used by some of the original thirteen states. See CC, at 1-4. Or, 
they might have added to the wording of the Fourth Amendment, as did 
Nevada and other states. See, generally, CC, at 4-9. Instead, they adhered to 
the language of the Fourth Amendment. 
 The evolution of Utah’s search and seizure provision—from a single 
reasonableness clause, to the Nevada model, to the near replica of the 
Fourth Amendment—suggests that Utah’s framers were satisfied with the 
protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment and intended to secure 
for Utahns those same protections. Indeed, given the evolving history of 
Utah’s provision, which culminated in the adoption of a provision mirror-
ing the Fourth Amendment, “it is difficult to argue that the Utah provision 
should be more broadly interpreted.” Antipolygamy Raids, supra, at 5. 
-14- 
c. Historical evidence suggests that both the framers and 
the people of Utah intended that Section 14 afford the 
same Fourth Amendment protections. 
 Historical evidence also supports the conclusion that both the framers 
of the Utah Constitution and the people who ratified it intended that Section 
14 afford the same protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. In 
approving the state constitution, Utahns understood that Section 14 was in-
spired by the Fourth Amendment. And the debates at the constitutional 
convention make it clear that when the framers copied the constitution, they 
meant to afford the same rights. 
 In adopting the Utah Constitution, the framers also adopted “an ad-
dress to the people of Utah, to accompany the Constitution,” when it was 
presented to the people for a vote on ratification. 2 Official Report of the Pro-
ceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on the Fourth 
Day of March, 1895, to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah 1847 (Salt Lake 
City, Star Printing Co. 1898) [hereinafter “Proceedings”]. That address made 
plain to Utahns that the inspiration behind Section 14 came from the Fourth 
Amendment:  
The inspiration behind the declaration of rights came from the 
great parent bill of rights framed by the fathers of our country. 
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2 Proceedings 1847. Where the language of Section 14 copied the Fourth 
Amendment, Utahns surely understood the guarantees of the two provi-
sions to be one and the same. 
 The debates at the convention also underscored an intent that Section 
14 afford the same rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. As noted, 
the Bill of Rights was the “inspiration,” i.e., the starting point or foundation, 
upon which the declaration of rights was built. And an examination of the 
declaration of rights, as adopted by the Convention, reveals that the framers 
generally retained the fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights. But the 
framers also understood that they were not obligated to provide protections 
identical to the Bill of Rights. Thus, Dennis Clay Eichnor, a member of the 
Rights Committee, “consulted [all] forty-four state constitutions, in prepar-
ing [the] declaration of rights. Id. at 102. In many instances, the framers bor-
rowed liberally from other state constitutions to clarify, supplement, or oth-
-16- 
erwise modify the federal right.9 In other words, they built upon the foun-
dation of the “great parent bill of rights.” 2 Proceedings 1847.  
                                              
9 See, e.g. Utah Const. art. I, § 1 (adding that all men have right “to 
worship according to the dictates of their consciences” and “to communi-
cate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right”); Utah Const. art. I, § 4 (incorporating First Amendment religious 
liberty clauses but adding that “[t]he rights of conscience shall never be in-
fringed,” that “[t]here shall be no union of church and State,” that participa-
tion in elections and juries may not be conditioned on religious beliefs, and 
that money may not be appropriated for religious functions or establish-
ments); Utah Const. art. I, § 6 (specifying that people’s right to bear arms is 
“for their security and defense”); Utah Const. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting “unnec-
essary rigor” of prisoners in addition to prohibiting excessive bails and 
fines, and cruel and unusual punishment, as found in Eighth Amendment); 
Utah Const. art. I, § 10 (expounding on right to jury trial); Utah Const. art. I, 
§ 12 (adding right to have “a copy” of the accusation, “the right to appear 
and defend in person,” the right “to testify in [one’s] own behalf,” and “the 
right to appeal in all cases,” providing that “the accused, before final judg-
ment, [could not] be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the[se] 
rights,” and adding that “a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife”); Utah Const. art. I, § 13 (permit-
ting initiation of criminal prosecution by grand jury indictment or, unlike 
Fifth Amendment, “by information after an examination and commitment 
by a magistrate”); Utah Const. art. I, § 15 (adding that freedom of speech 
and of press may not be restrained and setting parameters for defamation 
law); Utah Const. art. I, § 19 (defining treason using same terminology as 
U.S. Const., art. III, § 3, but unlike art. III, § 3, not recognizing that a convic-
tion for treason can be based on traitor’s confession in open court); Utah 
Const. art. I, § 20 (providing same rights of Third Amendment regarding 
quartering of soldiers, but adding provision that “[t]he military shall be in 
strict subordination to the civil power”); Utah Const. art. I, § 22 (prohibiting 
taking of private property for public use without just compensation, as in 
Fifth Amendment, but adding that private property may not be “damaged 
for public use without just compensation”). 
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 In other instances, the language of federal provisions was left unal-
tered (save for stylistic changes). As discussed, the framers left unaltered the 
language of the Fourth Amendment in Section 14. That section “was read 
and passed without amendment” or discussion. 1 Proceedings, at 319. But the 
framers’ intent that Section 14 afford the same protections guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment is evidenced in their debates on other provisions 
that were not altered from the federal language. 
 Section 21 (proposed as section 22) was proposed by the Rights 
Committee to read:  
 Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist in this State. 
1 Proceedings 326. This tracked the language of the Thirteenth Amendment: 
 Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for  crime whereof the party shall have been undu-
ly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIII. Orson Whitney moved to amend the proposed 
provision, so “that the word ‘whereof’ be stricken out and the words, ‘of 
which’ be substituted.” 1 Proceedings 326. This proposal to amend was swift-
ly opposed: 
Mr. EICHNOR.  I think that this is the language of the Consti-
tution of the United States. 
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Mr. WELLS:  Exactly. 
Mr. EICHNOR: I believe in adhering to the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States when we copy it. 
Mr. WHITNEY: It is a hundred years old. 
1 Proceedings 326 (emphasis added). Following this discussion, the question 
was taken on the motion and “the amendment was rejected.” 1 Proceedings 
326.  
 The debate regarding Section 5 reveals why the delegates believed in 
adhering to federal constitutional language when they copied it. Unlike Sec-
tion 21, Section 5 was originally proposed in language that differed from the 
United States Constitution: 
 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion, the pub-
lic safety imperatively demands it. 
1 Proceedings 252 (emphasis denoting difference from U.S Const. art. I, § 9). 
On objection of one of the delegates, the word “imperative” was stricken, as 
it was not found in any of the other constitutions. 1 Proceedings 252. Another 
delegate proposed that the provision be amended “by adding ‘in such a 
manner as shall be prescribed by law.’” 1 Proceedings 252-53. But Charles 
Varian opposed the amendment, asking why it “cannot . . . be safely left to 
such occasions and to be exercised in accordance with the general precedent 
and history of its exercise in this country.” 1 Proceedings 252-53. Others op-
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posed the amendment on grounds that both the United States Constitution 
and most state constitutions did not include such language. See 1 Proceedings 
253-57. The proposed amendment was thus rejected. Delegate Evans from 
Weber County then proposed that the words “demands it” be replaced with 
the words, “requires it,” as provided in the United States Constitution: 
I just want to say that is the exact language of the Constitution 
of the United States and [“demands it”] might be considered in 
a different way. The words, ‘requires it’ have a well understood 
meaning by the construction of the courts. Now it may be con-
sidered differently if we use the words ‘demands it,’ because it 
might be that there should be some demand made upon the au-
thorities whenever the public safety requires it. For that reason, 
I think it would be better to use the usual language. 
1 Proceedings 257. The question was thereafter taken upon the motion and 
the amendment was adopted by the Convention, resulting in a provision 
that tracked the language of the United States Constitution. 1 Proceedings 
257. 
 Another example was the debate on Section 12, which set forth the 
accused’s right “to be confronted by the witnesses against him.” Utah 
Const. art. I, § 12. Mr. Van Horne proposed an exception to the confronta-
tion right, where “evidence by deposition may be authorized by law.” 1 
Proceedings 306. This proposed amendment was met with fierce opposition 
on the grounds that it represented a departure from established precedent. 
In opposing the amendment, Charles Varian remarked that it “proposed to 
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interpolate something new here involving something that puts us all at sea; 
again, requiring, as of necessity it will, other judicial construction, and in-
terpretation . . . .” 1 Proceedings 307. Concluding his remarks, Mr. Varian 
asked:  
Why not leave it as it is?  Why not leave it within the ancient 
landmarks, so that every lawyer and every layman may know just 
what this does mean? Judicial decision after decision, all in one line, 
particularly have determined the meaning of this language as 
the committee have reported it here. Why should we stray away 
and put something in there that will tend to bring about and will 
doubtless bring about this confusion and conflict in interpretation? 
1 Proceedings 307-08 (emphasis added). The proposed amendment was 
thereafter rejected. 1 Proceedings 308. Once again, the framers rejected lan-
guage that would inject uncertainty in the right provided, in favor of lan-
guage whose meaning was well established. 
 The debates on these unaltered sections reveal that when the framers 
copied language from the United States Constitution, they did so to ensure 
that the provision would not “be considered in a different way.” 1 Proceed-
ings 257. When using language from the United States Constitution, or other 
constitutions, they did not seek to recognize rights that might be interpreted 
differently, but rather to guarantee rights that were firmly established by 
the courts. They sought stability and uniformity. 
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 In sum, the framers set as their inspiration the Bill of Rights and did 
not depart from the language of that charter in drafting Section 14. Absent 
evidence to the contrary, this Court should thus presume that the Constitu-
tion’s framers, and the people who ratified it, intended that the protections 
afforded under the Fourth Amendment and Section 14 “be one and the 
same.” Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221.  
3. The cases cited by Defendants do not support the proposi-
tion that the probable cause requirement of Section 14 is 
more demanding than that of the Fourth Amendment.  
 In support of their claim that Section 14’s probable cause requirement 
is more demanding than that of the Fourth Amendment, Defendants rely 
heavily on Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939). See Aple.Brf. 20-
21. They misread that case. 
 At issue in Lindbeck was a statute that required judges to issue a 
search warrant “ ‘[w]henever any person shall make affidavit ... that he has 
reason to believe that any receptacle (e.g., milk bottles) ... is in the posses-
sion of’ ” another business without lawful authority. 93 P.2d at 921 (quoting 
Rev. Stat. Utah § 95-2-10 (1933)). Lindbeck held that this provision “does not 
meet the constitutional requirements [of probable cause] and is therefore 
invalid.” Id. at 923. Based on Lindbeck’s holding, Defendants argue that 
“[h]aving reason to believe something means there are facts that one can point 
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to supporting that belief,” but that “reason to believe is not probable cause.” 
Aple.Brf. 21. This is a misreading of Lindbeck. 
 The Court did not read the statute as requiring that the affidavit in-
clude “the facts that one can point to supporting [a reasonable] belief.” 
Aple.Brf. 21. It read the statute as omitting such a requirement: “the statute 
here in question ... merely [requires] that the affiant ‘has reason to believe 
and does believe,’ without requiring him to furnish any evidence or cause” 
for that belief. Id. at 923. And that omission was the statute’s fatal flaw: “A 
warrant to search and seize, which follows upon a statement based solely 
upon the belief of the affiant, rests upon the reasoning of the affiant, based 
upon the secret facts of which he may have knowledge, and the conclusion 
which results from such reasoning is affiant’s, not that of the judicial of-
ficer.” Id. at 924.  
 Lindbeck held that probable cause exists where there is “an apparent 
state of facts that a discreet and prudent man would be led to the belief that 
the accused, at the time of the application for the warrant, was in possession 
of property.” Id. at 923 (citation omitted). Defendants contend that Lindbeck’s 
probable cause formulation is somehow different than the probable cause 
formulation of the Fourth Amendment—that based on the facts, a reasona-
ble person “would conclude ... that evidence of a crime actually will be 
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found.” Aple.Brf. 21 (emphasis added). But that formulation is no different 
than the Fourth Amendment formulation, requiring that there be “a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (emphasis added). And Defendant ultimately 
agrees. See Aple.Brf. 21 (observing that courts must consider “the totality of 
the circumstances and make a practical decision whether there is a fair 
probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place”). In-
deed, Lindbeck’s formulation is the same used by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
a case issued fourteen years before Lindbeck: 
“[T]he question [is] whether the affiant had reasonable grounds 
at the time of his affidavit and the issuance of the warrant for 
the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be 
searched, and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are 
such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to be-
lieve that there was a commission of the offense charged .... 
Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925) (emphasis added). 
 Defendants cite three other Utah cases in support of his claim of a 
more demanding probable cause standard under the state constitution: State 
v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986); Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 
(Utah App. 1997); and Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, 177 P.3d 655. 
But those cases either addressed the Fourth Amendment only, or treated the 
Fourth Amendment and Section 14 as coextensive. See Espinoza, 723 P.2d at 
421 (addressing probable cause challenge under Gates’s Fourth Amendment 
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formulation); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 (addressing reasonable suspicion 
challenge under Fourth Amendment); Bench, 2008 UT App 30, ¶7 (treating 
reasonable suspicion under Fourth Amendment and Section 14 as coexten-
sive). Those cases, therefore, also do not support Defendants’ claim of a 
more demanding probable cause standard under the Utah Constitution. 
B. This Court should pay great deference to the magistrate’s 
probable cause determination on a warrant. 
 Defendants also argue that this Court should conduct a de novo re-
view of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. Aplt.Brf. 12-18. De-
fendants urge the Court to reject the standard of review applied for Fourth 
Amendment probable cause determinations on a warrant, i.e., whether “the 
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]’ that probable cause 
existed.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 271 (1960)). They argue that anything less “destroys the probable cause 
standard, thereby diminishing individual civil rights.” Aple.Brf. 13. De-
fendants fundamentally misunderstand the nature of appellate review. 
 A standard of review does not alter the law or the requirements of the 
law. Rather, it is a policy decision, the “primary function” of which “is to 
apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and appel-
late courts for determining an issue or a class of issues. Put another way, a 
standard of review allocates discretion between trial and appellate courts.” 
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State v. Thurmond, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Utah 1993) (internal citations 
omitted). The appropriate standard of review for a given class of issues thus 
“ ‘turn[s] on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of jus-
tice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in 
question.’ ” Id. at 1266 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The sound ad-
ministration of justice dictates that the probable cause determination of 
magistrates on a warrant be reviewed deferentially. 
 Whether an affidavit establishes probable cause is a mixed question of 
fact and law. In its more recent cases, this Court has held that the applicable 
standard of review for mixed questions depends on whether the mixed 
question is “law-like or fact-like.” Sawyer v. Dep’t of Workforce Services, 2015 
UT 33, ¶11, 345 P.3d 1253. “Law-like mixed questions are reviewed de novo, 
while fact-like mixed questions are reviewed deferentially.” Id. To deter-
mine whether a mixed question is law-like or fact-like, this Court “evalu-
ate[s] the ‘marginal costs and benefits’ of conducting either a searching de 
novo review or a deferential review of a lower tribunal’s resolution of the 
mixed question.” Id. at ¶12. That cost-benefit analysis entails the balancing 
of three factors: 
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which 
the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial 
court’s application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by 
the trial judge, such as a witness’s appearance and demeanor, 
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relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately 
reflected in the record available to appellate courts; and (3) oth-
er policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion 
to trial courts. 
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶25, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 In cases involving a warrantless search or seizure, this Court applies 
de novo review. State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23, ¶5, 156 P.3d 795. The Court re-
views warrantless cases nondeferentially even though the first two factors 
favor appellate deference—“search and seizure issues are highly fact sensi-
tive,” State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994), and the facts upon 
which reasonableness is judged frequently depend on “a trial court’s credi-
bility assessments that cannot be adequately reflected in the record,” Levin, 
2006 UT 50, ¶26. But the Court has concluded that the third factor—policy 
considerations—outweighs the first two factors. The Court has reasoned 
that non-deferential review is warranted in these cases “ ‘given the substan-
tial Fourth Amendment interests’ ” at stake and “ ‘the interest in having uni-
form legal rules’ ” that govern an officer’s warrantless actions.  
 Warrant-based searches, like warrantless searches, are also fact-
intensive, “com[ing] in many shapes and sizes from many different types” 
of informants, Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, which again favors deferential review.  
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 And like warrantless searches, the judge (acting as magistrate) is in 
the better position to judge the facts supporting probable cause. It is true 
that the probable cause showing for a warrant-based search is generally 
judged not on testimony before trial courts after-the-fact, but on “the infor-
mation presented in the four corners of the affidavit.” United States v. Jack-
son, 470 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2006). This would seem to favor de novo re-
view, inasmuch as the appellate court seems just as capable of reviewing the 
factual allegations in an affidavit as a magistrate. But such a conclusion 
would ignore the fact that when an officer applies for a warrant, the magis-
trate is in a position to question the affiant to assure the accuracy of, or clari-
fy, the factual allegations in the affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 
166-67 (1978). Although the nature of this inquiry is ex parte, and does “not 
always permit the magistrate to make an extended independent examina-
tion,” id. at 169, the information gleaned from such an inquiry, as well as the 
magistrate’s likely familiarity with the officer, “cannot be adequately re-
flected in the record available to appellate courts.” Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶25. 
So, once again, this factor favors deferential review. Id.  
 Unlike warrantless searches, the policy considerations for warrant-
based searches also favor deferential review. In the case of a warrantless 
search or seizure, police act while “engaged in the often competitive enter-
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prise of ferreting out crime”—absent any review “by a neutral and detached 
magistrate.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). But a warrant-
based search or seizure protects citizens in the first instance “by interposing, 
ex ante, the ‘deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... between 
the citizen and the police.’ ” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006) 
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963)). For this rea-
son, both the Fourth Amendment, and thus by definition, Section 14 (supra, 
at, 3-24), express a strong preference for warrants. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 
(holding that Fourth Amendment embodies a “strong preference for search-
es conducted pursuant to a warrant”).  
 But if, on review, searches and seizures conducted with warrants 
were treated no differently than warrantless police action, the result would 
be a “grudging or negative attitude ... toward warrants.” Id. (quoting United 
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). Such an approach “is incon-
sistent with the ... strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a 
warrant.” Id. When officers secure a warrant, they act under the authority of 
a disinterested judiciary—satisfied that the search is supported by probable 
cause and that it is sufficiently limited in scope. Id. And when this occurs, 
“intrusion upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,” and thus 
by Section 14, “is less severe than otherwise may be the case.” Id. at 237 n.10.  
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 Moreover, and as Defendants seem to concede, see Aple.Brf. 21, the 
precise meaning of probable cause “cannot be articulated with precision.” 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001). 
As its very name implies, probable cause does not deal in certainties, but 
“turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates, 462 
U.S. at 232. As a result, “[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the 
question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause ....” Unit-
ed States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). For this reason, a magistrate’s 
probable cause determination should not be upset on review “so long as the 
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]’ that a search would 
uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citation omitted). 
Where reasonable minds may differ, it cannot be said that such a search is 
unreasonable, the “touchstone” of any search and seizure inquiry. See State 
v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, ¶22, 203 P.3d 1000 (recognizing that reasonableness 
is touchstone of constitutionality of any governmental search). 
 In sum, the strong, constitutional preference for warrants is best 
served by granting “ ‘great deference,’ ” to the probable cause determination 
of magistrates. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citation omitted). This standard of re-
view does not, as Defendants contend, weaken the probable cause standard. 
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It simply apportions greater responsibility to magistrates in determining 
probable cause given a magistrate’s advantaged position to assess the facts; 
the reality that the probable cause standard is “not readily, or even usefully, 
reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” id. at 232; and, most of all, given the 
strong preference for warrants. 
C. The magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the 
warrant was supported by probable cause. 
 The trial court concluded that based on its review of the search war-
rant affidavit, police “were ‘ultimately unsuccessful in corroborating any in-
formation provided by the CI.’ ” Aple.Brf. 23 (quoting R202) (emphasis sup-
plied by Defendants).  
 Defendants allege that the affiant was “satisfied to accept the CI’s 
word, which had not been and, apparently could not be, verified or con-
firmed in any way.” Aple.Brf. 24. But the affiant did not simply “accept the 
CI’s word” or exhibit “blind trust” in his statements, as Defendants incor-
rectly claim. Aple.Brf. 24. The affidavit demonstrates that police attempted 
to verify the facts they could and, when those efforts proved unsuccessful, 
conducted a controlled buy to corroborate the CI’s claim. For example, po-
lice “attempted through every avenue to try and identify Mike” by conduct-
ing “[r]ecords checks on the residence, registrations of vehicles, and request-
ing information from other agencies.” R63:¶10. But even after they “ex-
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hausted” those checks, Mike’s “personal identification” could not be veri-
fied. R63:¶10 (noting that Mike’s identity remained “unknown”). The affi-
davit then demonstrates that police conducted a controlled buy to corrobo-
rate the CI’s claim. 
 Defendants’ argument challenging the probable cause showing in the 
affidavit is the very sort of hypertechnical approach our courts have long 
disdained. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (holding that 
“the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in 
a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner”); accord Gates, 462 
U.S. at 236 (same); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985) (recog-
nizing that Supreme Court has rejected examination of warrant affidavit 
that is “ ‘hypertechnical and divorced from [reality]’ ”) (quoting Massachu-
setts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732 (1984)). Instead, “affidavits for search war-
rants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by mag-
istrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion.” Ventresca, 380 
U.S. at 109. That is what the trial court, and Defendants on appeal, have 
failed to do. 
 Defendants complain that the affidavit does not say when Mike was 
selling the drugs, how he knew where Mike kept the drugs, or how he knew 
about how the drugs were packaged. Aple.Brf. 22. They thus argue that 
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“[n]othing about the affidavit reflects that the allegations CI reported were 
‘based on his first-hand knowledge.’ ” Aple.Brf. 26 (quoting Aplt.Brf. 17). 
Not so. From the CI’s statement that Mike “was in possession of marijuana 
and would sell it to the CI,” the magistrate reasonably inferred that Mike 
was presently in possession of marijuana. R62:¶4. From the CI’s claim that 
he “has been in Mike’s home in the past and has made drug purchases from 
him,” the magistrate reasonably inferred that the CI saw the drugs inside 
Mike’s house, saw that Mike had the drugs in bulk, and saw how they were 
packaged (vacuum sealed). R62:¶4. And the description of vacuum-sealed 
packaging was, based on the officer’s training and experience, consistent 
with dealers of large quantities of marijuana. R62:¶4 (“from your affiant’s 
training and experience, individuals who package marijuana in this manner 
typically deal in large quantities”).10  
 Defendants, however, essentially ask the Court to “parse[] several 
statements in the affidavit to reach the ... conclusion” that probable cause 
does not exist. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶16, 104 P.3d 1265. For example, 
Defendants contend that the basis of the CI’s knowledge is unknown be-
cause the affidavit does not say that the CI specifically said that Mike had 
                                              
10 The magistrate could also reasonably infer that the CI’s claim that 
Mike “travel[ed] to California to obtain marijuana to sell here in Utah” came 
from conversations with Mike. R62:¶6.  
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the drugs currently, that the CI saw the marijuana in the house, or that the 
CI saw how the drugs were packaged. Aple.Brf. 22. And from the CI’s ad-
mission that he was “unsure of exactly where” in the house Mike kept the 
drugs, R62:¶6, Defendants would have the Court infer that “the CI had not 
seen drugs in the house,” Aple.Brf. 22—even though the CI said Mike 
“keeps his marijuana inside his residence,” R62:¶6. Defendants ignore the 
reasonable inference that when the CI has purchased drugs from Mike, the 
CI remained in one room of the house while Mike went somewhere else in 
the house and returned with the drugs. 
 In short, Defendants ask the Court to “construe[ ] passages in the af-
fidavit against the [magistrate’s] reasonable construction.” Saddler, 2004 UT 
105, ¶17. But the “[e]xcessive technical dissection of an informant’s tip or of 
the nontechnical language in the officer’s affidavit” is contrary to this 
Court’s task in construing the search warrant affidavit “in a common sense, 
reasonable manner.” State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987). 
“[R]eviewing courts should rely on a magistrate’s ‘reasonable construction’ 
of ambiguity in an affidavit,” not draw inferences that would defeat proba-
ble cause. Saddler, 2005 UT 105, ¶16. To do so is to take a “grudging or nega-
tive attitude” toward warrants. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. 
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 Defendants also ask the Court to draw inferences against a probable 
cause finding when they argue that “the affidavit contained significant er-
rors that called into question the officer’s own credibility.” Aple.Brf. 29. 
Specifically, Defendants point to the affiant’s statements concluding that (1) 
“[t]he CI has provided creditable information and has not said anything 
that would prove false or misleading,” and (2) “[t]he information the CI has 
given has been investigated and proved credible.” R62:¶5. Defendants ar-
gue that these representations of the officer draw his credibility into ques-
tion because he was unable to verify anything the CI said concerning Mike’s 
drug operations or identity. Aple.Brf. 29.  
 On this issue, the trial court observed that “[a]t best, these representa-
tions in the Affidavit are conclusory, at worst misleading.” R228:¶12 n.2. 
But the court ultimately rejected any claim that the officer “misle[d] the 
magistrate by misrepresenting facts in the affidavit.” R231-32; accord R275-
76 (“I’m not persuaded this is a case in which the magistrate was mislead 
[sic] by information in the affidavit or that information was presented that 
the affiant knew was false or should have known was false.”). And indeed, 
the affiant’s credibility representations were no more than the conclusions 
of the officer based on the controlled buy.  
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 After asserting that the CI’s information had been investigated and 
proved credible, R62:¶5, the affiant explained that the CI had agreed to par-
ticipate in a controlled buy in exchange for leniency on his charges, R62:¶5, 
described the steps taken during the controlled buy, and related the result 
of the controlled buy, R62:¶¶6-9. In other words, given the results of the 
controlled buy, the affiant merely claimed that “Mike was in possession of 
marijuana and would sell it to the CI” had “proved credible” and nothing 
the CI said proved to be “false or misleading.” R62:¶¶5-9. This is a “reason-
able construction” of the affidavit. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶16. To construe it 
otherwise is error. 
 Defendants also take issue with the State’s contention that the CI’s 
credibility was bolstered by his admission that he had purchased drugs 
from Defendant, Aplt.Brf. 17-18. Specifically, Defendants argue that the 
State’s reliance on United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971), is mis-
placed. Aple.Brf. 26-27. He contends that “it was only because the inform-
ant’s admissions in Harris was of ongoing and long term illegal activity, 
‘that over a long period and currently he had been buying illicit liquor on 
certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that property and fur-
nished probable cause.’ ” Aple.Brf. 27. But Harris did not suggest that an 
admission of criminal wrongdoing supports probable cause only if the ad-
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mission is “of ongoing and long term illegal activity,” as Defendants argue. 
Aple.Brf. 27.  
 Certainly, “admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to con-
temporaneous or later accusations of another.” Harris, 403 U.S. at 584. But 
Harris did not suggest that a criminal admission contributes to probable 
cause only if it is of ongoing and long-term activity. If it is, the admission 
“itself and without more, ... furnish[es] probable cause to search.” Harris, 403 
U.S. at 584 (emphasis added). But even if it doesn’t, a criminal admission is 
generally “sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to 
search.” Id. at 583 (emphasis added). Certainly such is the case if the crime 
has not yet been prosecuted. Harris thus went on to observe that even if an 
informant’s criminal admission could not be used at the defendant’s trial, 
such a rule “should not be extended to warrant proceedings to prevent 
magistrates from crediting, in all circumstances, statements of a declarant 
containing admissions of criminal conduct.” Id. at 584 (emphasis added). 
 In any event, the CI’s admission here suggests that his drug purchas-
es were both long term and ongoing. The CI had criminal charges pending 
against him and he admitted that he “has made drug purchases” from De-
fendant. R62:¶¶4-5. Moreover, the CI reported that Defendant “was in pos-
session of marijuana,” suggesting that he had recently been there to buy 
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drugs. R62:¶4 (emphasis added). “Common sense in the important daily af-
fairs of life would induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit 
these statements. People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evi-
dence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions.” Har-
ris, 403 U.S. at 583.11 
II. 
Section 14 contemplates the usual remedies of statu-
tory and common law, not exclusion at trial.  
 Defendants acknowledge, as they must, that the text of Section 14 
does not mention the suppression or exclusion of evidence as a remedy for a 
violation of its provisions. Aple.Brf. 35. But Defendants argue that Section 
14’s “language does not need to be explicit for exclusion to be constitution-
ally required.” Aple.Brf. 35. Defendants claim that “the meaning of the text, 
the meaning of the rights, implies exclusion as fundamental to the right.” 
Aple.Brf. 34. Their analysis is unpersuasive. 
                                              
11 Defendants also take issue with the State’s contention that the CI 
“risked losing the benefit of leniency in his criminal case if his report proved 
to be false.” Aplt.Brf. 16. They argue that “the risk of ‘losing the benefit’ [of 
leniency] is a fantasy” because police had no way of determining whether 
his report was false. Aple.Brf. 25-26. Not true: “The CI agreed to perform a 
controlled purchase of marijuana in exchange for leniency for pending 
charges against the CI.” R62:¶5. Accordingly, had the CI been unable to 
consummate the drug buy, he would not receive the benefit of leniency. 
That was clear. 
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 Defendants’ “textual” argument for a state exclusionary rule rests on 
the premise that Utah’s framers could not have intended to create a consti-
tutional right for which no remedy exists. Aple.Brf. 36. The State does not 
disagree. But the fact that the constitution contemplates a remedy does not 
mean that it contemplates exclusion as that remedy. It does not. 
 Defendants argue that Utah’s framers “would have understood there 
must be a way to protect and enforce” Section 14 rights. Aple.Brf. 40, 36. 
They assert that the framers “intended the rights recognized in section 14 to 
be self-executing.” Aple.Brf. 37. They reason therefrom that the search and 
seizure rights of Section 14 are “synonymous” with the remedy of exclusion, 
i.e., “exclusion is part and parcel of the right of the people to be secure from 
government crimes.” Aple.Brf. 37, 40. But while Section 14 is self-executing, 
it does not follow that the constitutional remedy for a violation is exclusion.  
 This Court has recognized that Section 14 is indeed “self-executing.” 
In re Jensen, 2011 UT 17, ¶63, 250 P.3d 465. The provision “directly prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures without probable cause for a warrant” 
and thus “sufficiently gives effect to the underlying rights and duties with-
out implementing legislation.” Id. But nothing in Section 14, nor in this 
Court’s treatment of self-executing constitutional rights, suggest that exclu-
sion is an appropriate, let alone a required, remedy. Rather, as explained in 
-39- 
In re Jensen, “a plaintiff’s remedy for state constitutional violation rests in the 
common law,” i.e., a claim for damages. Id. at ¶57 (emphasis added). Thus, 
less than 30 years after the constitution’s adoption, this Court recognized 
that a defendant’s remedy for a Section 14 violation is not exclusion, but suit 
“ ‘for the restoration of [his or her] property, and for the punishment of the 
trespasser or the announcement that the citizen may defend against such 
intrusion.’ ” State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704, 707 (1923) (citation omit-
ted). 
 An exclusionary remedy for a Section 14 violation would have been a 
radical departure from the practice and understanding of the time. See State 
v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶49, 267 P.3d 210 (Lee, J., concurring) (observing that 
“no appellate court in any state had excluded unlawfully obtained evidence 
under its constitution”). Had Utah’s framers intended to impose an exclu-
sionary remedy, surely they would have done so explicitly. They did so 
twice in Article I, § 12: “The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; [and] a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife ....” Thus, like the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination, Utah’s self-incrimination and spousal 
privilege rights “contain[ ] a self-executing rule commanding the exclusion 
of evidence derived from such communications.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
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298, 350 (1985). The absence of similar language in Section 14 bespeaks an 
intent not to impose an exclusionary remedy for violations of that provision, 
leaving it to “ ‘the usual and adequate provisions of the civil and criminal 
law.’ ” Aime, 220 P. at 702 (citation omitted).12 
 Defendants also claim that exclusion is necessary to “cur[e] the past 
harm, as well as protect[ ] against present and future violations.” Aple.Brf. 
36. They argue that absent exclusion, their rights would be “forever extin-
guish[ed]”—the privacy invasion continuing with the evidence’s admission 
at trial. Aple.Brf. 36-39. According to Defendants, “[e]xclusion is about un-
doing the government’s wrongs ... and re-securing an individual’s person 
and property.” Aple.Brf. 36. But again, nothing in the language of Section 
14, or in the practices of the day, supports the notion that Section 14 requires 
exclusion for violation of its provisions. Nor does Defendants’ reasoning 
withstand scrutiny. 
 As explained in the State’s opening brief, exclusion of the evidence 
cannot cure past harm. See Aplt.Brf. 43. And contrary to Defendants’ argu-
                                              
12 Defendants also assert that the exclusionary rule “does not make 
evidence merely inadmissible, it makes it utterly unavailable to the state.” 
Aple.Brf. 36. But even under this Court’s current jurisprudence, that is not 
true. The Court has held that the scope of the state exclusionary rule is lim-
ited, applying only to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. Sims v. Col-
lection Division of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6, 13 (Utah 1992) (plu-
rality opinion); Beller v. Rolfe, 2008 UT 68, ¶¶11-33 & n.2, 194 P.3d 949. 
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ment, “the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘works no new 
... harm.’ ” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). Specifically, the privacy invasion 
occasioned by the search of Defendants’ home does not continue following 
the State’s seizure of contraband to which Defendants were never lawfully 
entitled. The State “has decided—and there is no question about its power 
to do so—to treat the interest in ‘privately’ possessing [illegal drugs] as ille-
gitimate.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Accordingly, the 
privacy invasion occasioned by the allegedly unlawful search does not con-
tinue by use of the contraband in court.  
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobsen illustrates the point. 
There, Federal Express employees discovered a package containing a suspi-
cious white substance and turned it over to federal agents. Id. at 111. The 
agents did not simply examine what had been exposed to the employees, 
but field tested the substance and confirmed that it was cocaine. Id. at 111-
12. The U.S. Supreme Court held that even though the federal agents ex-
ceeded the scope of the private search, “the additional intrusion occasioned 
by the field test” did not implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy be-
cause defendant did not have “any legitimate interest in privacy” in the 
contraband. Id. at 122-23. Thus in this case, the State’s use of the contraband 
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as evidence works no new privacy invasion. See also Trupiano v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948) (recognizing that even though the illegal dis-
tillery may be suppressed under federal exclusionary rule, defendants had 
“no right to have it returned to them” because the illegal still “was contra-
band”).13 
 Citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Defendants claim that 
at the time of the Utah Constitution’s adoption, exclusion at trial was in fact 
the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations and that Section 14, which 
uses “nearly identical language,” was intended to follow suit. Aple.Brf. 41-
47. But as Justice Lee explained in his concurring opinion in Walker, there is 
“little ground for attributing to the framers of section 14” based on Boyd 
“that evidence collected in violation of its terms would be deemed inadmis-
sible in court.” 2011 UT 53, ¶58 (Lee, J., concurring). 
 First and foremost, the precise question in Boyd was never whether 
the remedy of exclusion is appropriate for failure to meet the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment.  
                                              
13 Accordingly, the federal exclusionary rule would apply in this case 
if the warrant-based search were unlawful—subject to the good faith excep-
tion—based on the deterrent rationale of the federal rule, not on a continu-
ing privacy invasion. 
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 At issue in Boyd was an 1874 law that compelled a defendant in a for-
feiture action to produce books and papers alleged to contain evidence of 
fraud against revenue and customs laws, and that if he did not produce 
them, the allegations of fraud would be deemed confessed. Id. at 619-20. The 
1874 law was a successor to two prior statutes (from 1863 and 1867) which, 
instead of compelling the papers’ production, authorized the issuance of a 
search warrant for their seizure. Id. at 620-21. Concluding that “the fourth 
and fifth amendments run almost into each other,” Boyd held that none of 
the statutes could withstand constitutional scrutiny because the search for, 
and seizure of, private papers to produce testimonial evidence are per se un-
reasonable. See id..  
 In sum, even though the Boyd decision resulted in exclusion of the ev-
idence in the subsequent forfeiture case, that outcome did not equate to a de-
cision that as a remedial matter, the fruits of an unlawful search must be 
suppressed. Boyd merely held that the statute and the processes thereunder 
upon which the government relied in pursuing forfeiture “were unconstitu-
tional and void” under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 638.  
 The U.S. Supreme Court in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), 
read Boyd similarly. In Adams, the Court specifically addressed whether ex-
clusion at trial was constitutionally required when agents seized personal 
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letters during a warrant-based search for illegal gambling slips. Answering 
in the negative, Adams held that “the courts do not stop to inquire as to the 
means by which the evidence was obtained.” Id. at 594. In support, it cited 
state and federal cases as far back as 1811 and through the 1890s. See id. at 
595. The Court held that the evidence is admissible at trial so long as it is 
relevant: 
“If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the 
warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint 
the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the 
wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the pa-
pers seized as evidence if they were pertinent to the issue ....” 
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Metcalf) 329, 337 (1841)).  
 Adams recognized Boyd’s holding that the statutory “procedure” at 
issue “was in violation of both the 4th and 5th Amendments” and thus “un-
constitutional and void as applied.” Id. at 596-97. However, Adams conclud-
ed that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were not designed to exclude ev-
idence unlawfully obtained, but “to protect against compulsory testimony 
from a defendant against himself in a criminal trial, and to punish wrongful 
invasion of the home of the citizen or the unwarranted seizure of his papers 
and property, and to render invalid legislation or judicial procedure having such 
effect.” Id. at 598 (emphasis added).  
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 Even if it could be said that Boyd created an exclusionary rule, its 
reach was clearly limited to the seizure of incriminating papers and did not 
extend to contraband. As noted, Boyd held that the statute at issue was per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it authorized the 
search and seizure of “a man’s private papers to establish a criminal charge 
against him, or to forfeit his property.” Id. at 622, 630. But Boyd concluded 
that the Fourth Amendment treated contraband differently. It held that “the 
search and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful for a person to 
have in his possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counter-
feit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, etc., are not with [the] cat-
egory” of unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 623-24 (emphasis add-
ed). Thus, to the extent Boyd created an exclusionary rule at all, it clearly 
limited application of the rule to those cases that would violate the spirit of 
the Fifth Amendment. The seizure of personal papers is not at issue here.  
III. 
A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would, 
in any event, be consistent with the intent of the 
framers and the people of Utah who ratified the state 
constitution. 
 Should this Court conclude that the magistrate did not have a sub-
stantial basis for finding probable cause, and should it further conclude that 
exclusion is a proper remedy for a violation of Section 14, the Court should 
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hold that exclusion is not appropriate here where the officer’s reliance on 
the warrant was objectively reasonable. See Aplt.Brf. 39-47. 
 As explained, supra, at 39-47, Aplt.Brf. 21-38, Section 14 does not in-
corporate an exclusionary remedy for a violation of its provisions. Utah’s 
framers left the redress of grievances for violations to “ ‘the usual and ade-
quate provisions of the civil and criminal law.’ ” Aime, 220 P. at 707 (citation 
omitted); see Aplt.Brf. 37-38. Nor is there a need now to create a judicial 
remedy because adequate remedies still exist today. See, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-201 (West 2015) (official misconduct); supra, at 40-41 (civil rem-
edies).  
 But even if this Court were to recognize a judicial remedy similar to 
the federal exclusionary rule, suppression for a warrant-based search later 
deemed unlawful is appropriate only where the warrant is flagrantly un-
lawful. Indeed, such a rule is consistent with the approach taken in the 
criminal and civil arena at the time of the framing. Criminal laws governing 
unlawful warrants applied only in the case of willful or malicious viola-
tions. See Revised Statutes of Utah § 5101 (1898) (making it a misdemeanor to 
“maliciously and without probable cause” secure a search warrant); Revised 
Statutes of Utah § 5102 (1898) (making it a misdemeanor to “willfully exceed 
... authority” in executing a search warrant). And civil redress requires fla-
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grant police misconduct. See In re Jensen, 2011 UT 17, ¶65 (holding that 
damages are appropriate only if aggrieved party suffered a flagrant viola-
tion). Moreover, the deterrence rationale of exclusion loses its force in the 
case of less severe violations. See Aplt.Brf. 39-41. 
 Defendants contend that this Court’s decision in State v. DeBooy, 2000 
UT 32, 996 P.2d 546, implicitly recognizes that absent probable cause, “po-
lice action [is] not protected by ... good faith reliance upon the magistrate’s 
authorization.” Aple.Brf. 48. Not so. Defendants treat judicial authorization 
of an administrative traffic checkpoint as a warrant, but this Court did not 
treat it as a warrant. The Court judged the checkpoints under the reasona-
bleness clause of Section 14. See DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶31 n.11 (observing 
that its decision governed “suspicionless, investigatory, nonemergency 
checkpoints”). DeBooy, therefore, offers no support for Defendants’ claim 
that exclusion is inappropriate notwithstanding an officer’s objective, good 
faith reliance on a warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the State’s opening 
brief, the Court should reverse. 
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 U.S. Const. amend IV The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 
1 
 
DE 
Dec. 7, 1787 
Del. Const. art. I, § 6 
(Dec. 2, 1831) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or 
things, shall issue without describing them as particularly as 
may be, nor then, unless there be probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation.  
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='DE'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895 1 
2 PA 
Dec. 12, 1787 
Penn. Const. art. I, § 8 
(Jan. 1, 1874) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or 
things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may 
be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation subscribed to by the affiant. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='PA'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
3 NJ 
Dec. 18, 1787 
N.J. Const. art. I, § 6 
(Aug. 13, 1844) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
papers and things to be seized. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NJ'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251
,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895 
                                            
 1 This Addendum sets forth the search and seizure provisions of the various states as of 1895.  
The date below the State represents its admission date.  The date below the state constitutional provision 
represents the version of that constitution.  Sources are generally from governmental, historical, or 
educational websites, including the NBER/University of Maryland State Constitutions Project, “a portal 
to the texts of the state constitutions of the United States.”  See www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu. 
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4 GA 
Jan. 2, 1788 
Geo. Const. § 1, par. 
XVI (1877) 
(as ratified without 
subsequent 
amendments) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
except upon probable cause, supported by oath, or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place, or places, to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/con1877b.htm (University of Georgia—Carl Vinson Institute of Government)  
5 CN 
Jan. 9, 1788 
Conn. Const. art. I, § 8 
(Oct. 12, 1818) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures, and 
no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or 
things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may 
be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='CT'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
6 MA 
Feb. 6, 1788 
Mass. Const. Part the 
First, art. XIV (1780) 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, 
and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary 
to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not 
previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order 
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected 
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to 
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or 
seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and 
with the formalities, prescribed by the laws. 
 http://www.founding.com/library/lbody.cfm?id=478&parent=475
7 MD 
Apr. 28, 1788 
Mary. Const. Dec. Rts. 
art. 26  
(Aug. 17, 1867) 
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search 
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are 
grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search 
suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, 
without naming or describing the place, or the person in 
special, are illegal, an ought not to be granted. [Note: The 
Declaration of Rights to the 1867 Constitution includes 45 
"articles," and no sections. Because the constitution then 
continues with Article I, we have coded these articles as 
sections in the 9002 article representing the Declaration of 
Rights.] 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='MD'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895 
State-by-State Comparison Chart Addendum to Reply Brief 
 
3 
 
8 SC 
May 23, 1788 
S.C. Const. art. I, § 22 
(Apr. 16, 1868) 
All persons have a right to be secure from unreasonable 
searches or seizures of their persons, houses, papers or 
possessions. All warrants shall be supported by oath or 
affirmation, and the order of the warrant to a civil officer to 
make search or seizure in suspected places, or to arrest one 
or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, shall 
be accompanied with a special designation of the persons or 
objects of search, arrest or seizure; and no warrant shall be 
issued but in the cases and with the formalities prescribed by 
the laws. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='SC'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251
,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895 
9 NH 
June 21, 1788 
N.H. Const. art. I, § 19 
(Sep. 5, 1792) 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, 
and all his possessions; Therefore, All warrants to search 
suspected places, or arrest a person for examination or trial, 
in prosecutions for criminal matters, are contrary to this 
right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously 
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in a 
warrant to a civil officer to make search in suspected places, 
or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their 
property, be not accompanied with a special designation of 
the persons or object of search, arrest, or seizure; and no 
warrant ought to be issued but in cases and with the 
formalities prescribed by law. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NH'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
10 VA 
June 25, 1788 
Vir. Const. art. I, § 10 
(1870) 
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may 
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence 
of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not 
named, or whose offense is not particularly described and 
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and 
ought not to be granted. 
 http://www.harbornet.com/rights/virginia.txt 
11 NY 
July 26, 1788 
N.Y. Const. (Nov. 6, 
1894) 
*No search protection provided.   
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/Search.aspx
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12 NC 
Nov. 21, 
1789 
N.C. Const. art. I, § 15 
(July 1, 1868) 
General warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of 
the act committed, or to seize any persons not named, whose 
offence is not particularly described and supported by 
evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be 
granted. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='NC'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
13 RI 
May 29, 1790 
R.I. Const. art. I, § 6 
(May 3, 1843) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers 
and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on 
complaint in writing, upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation and describing as nearly as may be, the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='RI'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251,
151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895 
14 VT 
Mar. 4, 1791 
Ver. Const. chap. I, 
art. 11 (as established 
July 9, 1793 and 
amended through Nov. 
5, 2002) 
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their 
houses, papers, and possessions, free from search or seizure; 
and therefore warrants, without oath[s] or affirmation[s] first 
made, affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby 
any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to 
search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, 
his, her or their property, not particularly described, are 
contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted. 
 http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/const2.htm; http://vermont-archives.org/govhistory/constitut/con93.htm 
15 KY 
June 1, 1792 
Kent. Const. § 10 (as 
ratified on Aug. 3, 
1891, and revised Sep. 
28, 1891) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and 
no warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any 
person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may 
be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation.  
 http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/Legresou/constitu/010.htm
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16 TN 
June 1, 1796 
Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7 
(adopted Feb. 23, 1870 
and ratified on the 
fourth Saturday of 
Mar., 1870) 
http://www.state.tn.us/
sos/bluebook/online/se
ction5/tnconst.pdf 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may 
be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence 
of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not 
named, whose offences are not particularly described and 
supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and ought 
not to be granted. 
 http://www.tngenweb.org/law/constitution1870.html
17 OH 
Mar. 1, 1803 
Ohio Const. art. I, § 14 
(ratified Mar. 10, 
1851) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person and things to be seized. 
 http://www.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/ohgovernment/constitution/cnst1851.html
18 LA 
Apr. 30, 1812 
Louis. Const. Bill Rts., 
Art. 2 (ratified Dec. 8, 
1879) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue 
except upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the person or things to be seized. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='LA'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,25
1,151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,
161,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,2
41,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,19
4,195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
19 IN 
Dec. 11, 1816 
Ind. Const. art. I, § 11 
(ratified Nov. 1, 1851) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
 http://www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/inconst/art-1.html#sec-11 
 
http://www.statelib.lib.in.us/www/ihb/resources/constarticle1.html
20 MS 
Dec. 10, 1817 
Miss. Const. art. III, § 
23 (adopted Nov. 1, 
1890) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and 
possessions from unreasonable seizure or search; and no 
warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be 
searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
 http://www.sos.state.ms.us/ed_pubs/Constitution/2007/Mississippi%20Constitution.pdf; 
http://www.sos.state.ms.us/pubs/constitution/constitution.asp
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21 IL 
Dec. 3, 1818 
Ill. Const. art. II, § 6 
(Aug. 8, 1870) 
 
art. I., § 6 (ratified 
1970) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
without probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='IL'&CID=116,117,118,139,119,124,179,246,247,248,249,251,
151,231,193,173,157,158,159,153,154,155,156,101,102,103,104,100,105,259,260,261,262,108,109,110,111,125,126,127,128,107,106,1
61,162,160,120,121,122,123,178,209,207,215,210,211,212,213,214,216,218,176,163,164,165,172,190,198,197,192,184,185,239,240,24
1,242,238,244,245,188,235,236,237,112,113,114,269,145,146,147,148,149,183,181,182,257,258,199,263,171,252,253,254,255,256,194,
195,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,223,264,265,267,268,243,115,225,230,177&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895 
22 AL 
Dec. 14, 1819 
Ala. Const. art. I, § 6 
(ratified Nov. 16, 
1875) 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and possessions from unreasonable seizure or 
searches, and that no warrant shall issue to search any place, 
or to seize any person or thing, without probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation. 
 http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/constitutions/1875/1875_1.html
23 ME 
Mar. 15, 
1820 
*Maine Const. art. I, § 
5 (1820) (last modified 
1/1/2003) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or 
thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, nor 
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=176&AID=2001&SID=16654&MID=-1&key=search 
24 MO 
Aug. 10, 
1821 
Missouri Const. art. II, 
§ 11 (1875) 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or 
thing, shall issue without describing the place to be 
searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as nearly as 
may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written 
oath or affirmation. 
 http://www.moga.mo.gov/const/A01015.HTM 
25 AR 
June 15, 1836 
Ark. Const. art. II, § 
15 (1874) 
The right of the people of this State to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue, except upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
 http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/data/constitution/ArkansasConstitution1874.pdf
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26 MI 
Jan. 26, 1837 
Mich. Const. art. VI, § 
26 (adopted Aug. 15, 
1850) 
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person 
shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No 
warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things, 
shall issue without describing them, or without probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation. 
 http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/historical/miconstitution1850.htm
27 FL 
Mar. 3, 1845 
Fla. Const. Decl. Rts., 
§ 22 (1885)  
 
*art. I, § 12 as 
amended in 1982 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and 
searches, shall not be violated, and no warrants issued but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, 
and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized. 
 http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/conhist/1885con.html (Florida State University)
28 TX 
Dec. 29, 1845 
Tex. Const. art. I, § 9 
(1876) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and possessions from all unreasonable seizures or searches, 
and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or 
thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, 
nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
 http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/IART01.html (University of Texas at Austin - Tarton Law Library) 
29 IA 
Dec. 28, 1846 
Iowa Const. art. I, § 8 
(1857) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and 
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons and things to be seized. 
 http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Constitution.html#a1s8
30 WI 
May 29, 1848 
Wisc. Const. art. I, § 
11 (1848) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 http://www.legis.state.wi.us/rsb/unannotated_wisconst.pdf
State-by-State Comparison Chart Addendum to Reply Brief 
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31 CA 
Sep. 9, 1850 
Cal. Const. art. I, § 19 
(ratified 1849) (revised 
in 1879) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and 
searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons and things to be seized. 
 http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/level3_const1849txt.html
32 MN 
May 11, 1858 
Minn. Const. art. I, § 
10 (adopted 1857) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or things to be seized. 
 http://www.mnhs.org/library/constitution/transcriptpages/rt.html; http://www.mnhs.org/library/constitution/index.html 
33 OR 
Feb. 14, 1859 
Ore. Const. art. I, § 9 
(1859) 
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable search or seizure; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
 http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/bill_rights3.htm
34 KS 
Jan. 29, 1861 
Kan. Const. Bill of 
Rts, § 15 (adopted at 
Wyandotte July 29, 
1859) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons and 
property against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be 
inviolate, and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person and property to be 
seized. 
 http://www.kshs.org/research/collections/documents/online/wyandotteconstitution.htm#billrights (Kansas State Historical Society)
35 WV 
June 20, 1863 
W.V. Const. art. II, § 3 
(ratified Apr. 24, 
1862) 
The right of the citizens to be secure in their houses, 
persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons and things to be seized. 
 http://www.wvculture.org/HISTORY/statehood/constitution.html (West Virginia Division of Culture and History);  
http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=225&AID=2977&SID=27352&MID=-1&key=search 
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36 NV 
Oct. 31, 1864 
Nev. Const. art. I, § 18 
(ratified Sep. 1, 1864) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and 
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, 
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, 
and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized. 
 http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Const/NvConst.html#Art1
37 NE 
Mar. 1, 1867 
Neb. Const. art. I, § 7 
(1875). 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
 http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/legaldocs/view.php?page=c0101007000
38 CO 
Aug. 1, 1876 
Colo. Const. art. II, § 7 
(adopted by 
convention Mar. 14, 
1876)  
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and no warrant to search any place or seize any person or 
thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched, 
or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor 
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
reduced to writing. 
 http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/constitution/1876.pdf
39 ND 
Nov. 2, 1889 
N.D. Const. art. I, § 18 
(Aug. 17, 1889) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons and things to be seized. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/showASM.aspx?CID=257&AID=3637&SID=34752&MID=-1&key=search 
 
(Univ. of Maryland NBER/Maryland State Constitutions Project)
40 SD 
Nov. 2, 1889 
S.D. Const. art. VI, § 
11 (ratified Oct. 1, 
1889) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches any 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issued 
but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
 http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/Search/results.aspx?srch=6&state='SD'&CID=223&art=&sec=&amd=&key=&Yr=03/04/1895
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41 MT 
Nov. 8, 1889 
Mont. Const. art. III, § 
7 (ratified Oct. 1, 
1889) 
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, 
and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no 
warrant to search any place or seize any person or thing 
shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or 
the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause, 
supported by oath or aflirmation, reduced to writing. 
 http://www.umt.edu/Law/library/1889%20Montana%20Constitution.pdf
42 WA 
Nov. 11, 
1889 
Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 
(approved Oct. 1, 
1889) 
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his 
home invaded, without authority of law. 
 http://www.secstate.wa.gov/history/constitution_view.aspx?i=1889
43 ID 
July 3, 1890 
Ida. Const. art. I, § 17 
(ratified July 3, 1890) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized.   
 http://dfm.idaho.gov/cdfy2007/OtherDocuments/id-constitution.pdf
44 WY 
July 10, 1890 
Wyo. Const. art. I, § 4 
(ratified Nov. 5, 1889) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to 
be seized.   
 http://soswy.state.wy.us/informat/07Const.pdf 
45 UT 
Jan. 4, 1896 
Utah Const. art. I, § 14 
(adopted May 8, 1895 
and ratified 1895) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 http://www.le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/66.htm 
2 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah 1856 
 
